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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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254. Chances for Free Elections in Iran

The Iranian Government has announced that national elections will be held after the end of the period of national mourning on 5 July and are expected to continue over a period of about three months. At present the Senate and Majlis (lower house) are under the Shah's control, the government, led by Prime Minister Eqqbal, being in the hands of the Melliyun (Nationalist) Party with the Mardom (People's) Party constituting the "loyal" opposition. Iran has never held free elections, and the Shah follows the practice of selecting candidates as he chooses. According to the Constitution, half of the members of the Senate are not elected but are appointed by the Shah himself. However, he has said (on June 5) that "The elections are party elections but will take place with complete freedom." Thus, for the first time he has announced to the public that the elections will be held on a party basis and that the Iranian electors (consisting of males over 20 years of age) will have a choice between Melliyun and Mardom candidates. In passing, it is probably worth noting that both these parties were created by the Shah about two years ago and both are controlled by him. It is possible that he may permit some independents to participate in the elections. In summary, although free elections are provided for in the Iranian Constitution, the Shah has always been the predominating influence. The elections will probably take place in an atmosphere of continuing Soviet attempts to influence the people of Iran to rise against their "US-dominated" rulers, to organize a National Front led by the Tudeh (Communist) Party, to overthrow the Shah (against whom they are still conducting vicious broadcasts on their clandestine radios), to adopt a policy of neutrality (and, of course, cooperation with their giant northern neighbor), and to abandon both their alliance with the free world (including their membership in CENTO) and their provision of air bases to the US.

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255. Japan's Crisis

On 20 May 1960, the Lower House of the Japanese Diet ratified the US-Japan Security Treaty. Although greatly liberalized (e.g., the US pledged itself to consult Japan before making any major changes in US troop deployment into Japan, major changes in our equipment, or use of US bases for military combat operations outside Japan) the new treaty is the subject of much controversy because of the widespread pacifism in the country and the spectrum of political differences, including bickering among factions of the majority, Liberal Democratic Party. The vote for ratification was accomplished by the representatives of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party only after police had effected the release of the Speaker of the Lower House, who had been imprisoned in his office for some six hours by the socialists in an effort to prevent action on the treaty. The socialists therefore boycotted the session in which the vote was taken on the treaty. This vote was the spark which set off the month-long demonstrations which culminated in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit. The principal participants in the violent demonstrations in Tokyo were: the Zengakuren, a student organization so left in orientation that it has been criticized by the Japan Communist Party; Sohyo, the largest trade union organization in Japan, heavily infiltrated by Communists; and the Japan Socialist Party, whose leader, Inejiro Asanuma, proclaims the US the common enemy of Communist China and Japan. The demonstrations, which began as loosely organized protests of the Diet vote, rapidly came under control of Communist activists. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda broadcasts made it clear that their objectives were defeat of the treaty and the denigration of Eisenhower. Financial support was channeled by bank transfers from Hong Kong, by yen earnings of "cultural troops" left in Japan for support of Communist activities, and, probably, by couriers. A disturbing aspect of the situation was the tacit support given the demonstrators by the traditionally anti-government press and the leaders of various educational institutions. As a result of the crisis the Kishi government is pledged to resign, dissolve the Diet, and call a general election. The election, which will probably take place this fall, will be a critical test of Japan's future orientation as well as its democratic development. Three principal parties will be involved: the Liberal Democratic Party of Kishi, rent with factionalism and tarnished by the tactics of the treaty vote; the Japan Socialist Party, involved in the violent demonstrations and apparently so frustrated by repeated defeat at the polls it has given up hope for success save through mob action; and, the Democratic Socialist Party, formed only in 1959, professing socialism akin to that of Western Europe and stressing the need for a responsible opposition.

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256. Soviets Appoint Spy Ambassador to Cuba

Press and intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Union may appoint Sergei M. Kudryavtsev ambassador to Cuba. Although the appointment has not been officially acknowledged, the desire to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries has been announced, and reports indicate that the Soviet embassy in Habana may be opened in mid-July 1960. If Kudryavtsev becomes ambassador, his well-known connection with Soviet intelligence merits wide publicity. The Report of the Royal Commission which investigated Soviet espionage in Canada in 1946 clearly established documentary proof that Kudryavtsev, from 1942 to 1945, under cover of First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, was actually an officer of Soviet Military Intelligence. Agent files taken from the Soviet Embassy by the defector, Igor Gouzenko, showed that Kudryavtsev, was, in fact, the man who first took charge of Soviet espionage in Canada. In early 1943, the Soviets expanded their espionage mission there, and Kudryavtsev was superseded as chief by Nikolay Zabotin, "Military Attache". He continued to work under Zabotin, however, and the fact he was awarded the "Order of the Badge of Honor" and the "Red Banner of Labor" during this period indicates his apparent demotion meant no dissatisfaction with his work but only that the Soviets added more senior officers to their spy staff in Ottawa. Zabotin, incidentally, was subsequently liquidated. Since World War II, Kudryavtsev has continued to serve in a number of "diplomatic" assignments in sensitive areas of Soviet and Free World relations. In February 1947, he was second ranking member of the Soviet component of the United Nations Investigation Commission for Greece. Later that year, he was in New York as Counselor of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations. Because of revelations of the Canadian spy case, he was removed from this assignment. From January 1952 until December 1955, Kudryavtsev was stationed in Austria as Soviet Political Advisor to the High Commissioner. From December 1955 until September 1957, he was Minister Counselor in Bonn. In May 1959, he arrived in Paris, his current post, with the same diplomatic designation.

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257. Disarmament

The Soviet walk-out from the Geneva 10-nation disarmament conference is the latest step in Khrushchev's breaking of relations with the Eisenhower administration in order to denigrate Eisenhower personally, undermine the leadership of the United States in the free world, induce splits between and among the Western allies, and increase support from the uncommitted nations for the Soviet disarmament proposal specifically and its role as peacemaker generally. Khrushchev has been careful (if arrogant) in this issue, as after the Summit failure, to assert that further action will be possible at a time subsequent to a change of administration in the US. The Soviet Union has asked that disarmament be included on the agenda of the next General Assembly session of the UN this fall. The USSR will attempt to demonstrate that it has been the Western powers, and particularly the US, who have refused to negotiate and who have ignored the terms of reference of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1959. The USSR may ask for another conference on disarmament probably within the UN framework and with changed representation possibly demanding the inclusion of the Chinese Communists. To sustain the initiative created by the submission of their revised disarmament plan on 2 June, the Soviet Union will attempt to obtain UN indorsement for the general features of its plan - the principle of complete and general disarmament within a definite period of time and the inclusion of controls over the destruction of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the initial stage of disarmament. Western tactics will be complicated by concurrent elections in the US. There is little doubt, however, that by 1961 some kind of disarmament conference will be scheduled. The Western nations are considering various measures designed to expose the break-up as a political move and to achieve a UN or multi-nation demand that the Soviet Union resume immediate negotiation. 25X1C10b

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258. Yugoslav Views on Relations Between Communist States

Yugoslavia's most recent affirmation of its "separate road to socialism" is contained in the 22 June issue of Kommunist, which advocates the establishment of the broadest form of cooperation among all "socialist" and other "progressive forces," without ideological and political exclusiveness, and on the basis of equality, mutual confidence, respect and non-interference. According to the journal, which is the organ of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, differences of opinion can be reduced only through cooperation, contacts and frank exchange of views and experiences. The article further states that today, when socialism is becoming a matter of practice or aspiration for the majority of mankind, to consider this or that experience absolute from the standpoint of ideology will only hinder the free current of progressive ideas. It is senseless to expect that everything conform to the same pattern on the wide front of the move toward socialism. Ideological and political exclusiveness only leads to isolation and weakening of socialist forces and serves to expand the field of activity of the reactionary forces throughout the world. The assertions of the "left" (i. e., China) that this is done in the name of the purity of Marxism-Leninism is not to the point; the correctness of this or that policy is not appraised according to what its advocates think about it themselves but according to the objective operation of their policy. By this explicit formulation of its ideas on relations between "socialist" states, Yugoslavia has again served notice on the Soviet Union and Peking not only of its continued adherence to its own brand of communism but also of its intent to export "Titoism" to the Afro-Asian nations.

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V.A. Zorin, a top Soviet diplomat who has specialized in Central European affairs, is the head of the Soviet delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, recently broken off by the Soviets. From August 1952 to March 1953 Zorin was the permanent Soviet representative at the UN. Since that time he has been closely associated with peace and disarmament negotiations. He was a member of the USSR delegation to the Conference on European Peace and Security held in Moscow in 1954 and in Warsaw in 1955. In 1957 he participated in the London talks on disarmament, held by the Subcommittee of the UN Commission on Disarmament. He headed the Soviet delegation to the 13th Session of the UN General Assembly. He was present at the Foreign Ministers meeting of Warsaw Pact nations in April 1959 and was the second-ranking Soviet delegate at the Foreign Ministers Conference held in May and September 1959 in Geneva. Born on 25 January 1902 in Rostov province of either Jewish or Volga German parents, his career and character are typical of the New Soviet Man (See Bi-Weekly Guidance #38, Item 230). From 1922-1932 he worked with the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol; from 1935-1941 he was engaged in Party and pedagogical work. In 1941 he was transferred to a leading post in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and soon specialized in European affairs. He first achieved international prominence in 1948 when, under the guise of ambassador, he master-minded the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. From 1948-1955 he was USSR Deputy Foreign Minister serving under Molotov and A. Vyshinsky, whose fame rested on the conduct of purge trials during the thirties and the "organization" of Latvia and Rumania after they were absorbed in the Soviet orbit. From 1955 to 1956 Zorin was the first Soviet ambassador to the German Federal Republic after the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Observers describe him as cold, hard, and evil, "less a human being, more of a 'New Soviet Man' than either Malik or Gromyko." 25X1C10b
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260. French-Algerian Negotiations

The French government and the FLN (National Front for Independence) have begun negotiations to bring the six year old Algerian war to an end. Among the issues at stake are: (1) The supervision which will be maintained over elections; (2) The disposition of the French army in Algeria and the ALN (National Army of Liberation); (3) The precise definition of the alternatives offered under self-determination. There is opposition to these negotiations by extreme right wing groups within France and the Europeans in Algeria both of whom aim at keeping Algeria part of metropolitan France even in some quarters if this necessitates the overthrow of de Gaulle. There are indications that within the ALN there are elements which also oppose any negotiated peace which does not provide for immediate independence. With an eye to establishing themselves in a future Algerian republic, the Chinese Communists are wooing the FLN and the ALN assiduously and consequently are opposed to the negotiations. However, the majority of Algerian Moslems and most of the left and center political groupings in France currently appear to endorse the idea of peace by negotiation. It is doubtful that the preliminary and initial talks will result in a resolution of the Algerian war, but there may exist flexibility in the positions of de Gaulle and the FLN which would make ultimate agreement possible.

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
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Attachment to Item No. 256:



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